Author: CISA

  • FUJIFILM Healthcare Americas Synapse Mobility

    View CSAF

    1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

    • CVSS v4 5.3
    • ATTENTION: Exploitable remotely/low attack complexity
    • Vendor: FUJIFILM Healthcare Americas Corporation
    • Equipment: Synapse Mobility
    • Vulnerability: External Control of Assumed-Immutable Web Parameter

    2. RISK EVALUATION

    Successful exploitation of this vulnerability could allow an attacker to access information beyond their assigned roles.

    3. TECHNICAL DETAILS

    3.1 AFFECTED PRODUCTS

    The following versions of FUJIFILM Healthcare Americas Synapse Mobility are affected:

    • Synapse Mobility: Versions prior to 8.2

    3.2 VULNERABILITY OVERVIEW

    3.2.1 EXTERNAL CONTROL OF ASSUMED-IMMUTABLE WEB PARAMETER CWE-472

    FUJIFILM Healthcare Americas Synapse Mobility versions prior to 8.2 contains a privilege escalation vulnerability through external control of Web parameter. Exploitation of this vulnerability could allow an attacker to bypass authentication and access information beyond role-based access controls.

    CVE-2025-54551 has been assigned to this vulnerability. A CVSS v3.1 base score of 4.3 has been calculated; the CVSS vector string is (AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N).

    A CVSS v4 score has also been calculated for CVE-2025-54551. A base score of 5.3 has been calculated; the CVSS vector string is (AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N).

    3.3 BACKGROUND

    • CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE SECTORS: Healthcare and Public Health
    • COUNTRIES/AREAS DEPLOYED: Worldwide
    • COMPANY HEADQUARTERS LOCATION: Japan

    3.4 RESEARCHER

    Christopher Alejandro (Moroco) reported this vulnerability to CISA.

    4. MITIGATIONS

    FUJIFILM Healthcare Americas has released the following mitigation options for users to follow:

    • It is recommended to upgrade to the latest version of the product or any version from 8.2 and later to resolve this issue.
    • There is an immediate mitigation available of disabling the search function in the configurator settings. Access to the search function for all users can also be removed by unchecking the “Allow plain text accession number” check box in the security section of the admin interface. This will limit the site to use of the product only via the SecureURL feature.
    • Patches have been released which will remediate the vulnerability for software versions 8.0-8.1.1.

    FUJIFILM Healthcare Americas strongly encourages users to update the Synapse Mobility application to the latest version if they are past their end of support date.

    For more information, refer to Synapse Mobility Vulnerability Notification.

    CISA recommends users take defensive measures to minimize the risk of exploitation of this vulnerability, such as:

    • Minimize network exposure for all control system devices and/or systems, ensuring they are not accessible from the internet.
    • Locate control system networks and remote devices behind firewalls and isolating them from business networks.
    • When remote access is required, use more secure methods, such as Virtual Private Networks (VPNs), recognizing VPNs may have vulnerabilities and should be updated to the most current version available. Also recognize VPN is only as secure as the connected devices.

    CISA reminds organizations to perform proper impact analysis and risk assessment prior to deploying defensive measures.

    CISA also provides a section for control systems security recommended practices on the ICS webpage on cisa.gov/ics. Several CISA products detailing cyber defense best practices are available for reading and download, including Improving Industrial Control Systems Cybersecurity with Defense-in-Depth Strategies.

    CISA encourages organizations to implement recommended cybersecurity strategies for proactive defense of ICS assets.

    Additional mitigation guidance and recommended practices are publicly available on the ICS webpage at cisa.gov/ics in the technical information paper, ICS-TIP-12-146-01B–Targeted Cyber Intrusion Detection and Mitigation Strategies.

    Organizations observing suspected malicious activity should follow established internal procedures and report findings to CISA for tracking and correlation against other incidents.

    CISA also recommends users take the following measures to protect themselves from social engineering attacks:

    No known public exploitation specifically targeting this vulnerability has been reported to CISA at this time.

    5. UPDATE HISTORY

    • August 21, 2025: Initial Publication
  • Mitsubishi Electric Corporation MELSEC iQ-F Series CPU Module

    View CSAF

    1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

    • CVSS v3 5.3
    • ATTENTION: Exploitable remotely/Low attack complexity
    • Vendor: Mitsubishi Electric Corporation
    • Equipment: MELSEC iQ-F Series CPU module
    • Vulnerability: Improper Handling of Length Parameter Inconsistency

    2. RISK EVALUATION

    Successful exploitation of this vulnerability could result in a remote attacker being able to delay the processing of the Web server function and prevent legitimate users from utilizing the Web server function by sending a specially crafted HTTP request.

    3. TECHNICAL DETAILS

    3.1 AFFECTED PRODUCTS

    The following versions of MELSEC iQ-F Series CPU module are affected:

    • MELSEC iQ-F Series CPU module FX5U-32MT/ES: Versions 1.060 and later
    • MELSEC iQ-F Series CPU module FX5U-32MT/DS: Versions 1.060 and later
    • MELSEC iQ-F Series CPU module FX5U-32MT/ESS: Versions 1.060 and later
    • MELSEC iQ-F Series CPU module FX5U-32MT/DSS: Versions 1.060 and later
    • MELSEC iQ-F Series CPU module FX5U-32MR/ES: Versions 1.060 and later
    • MELSEC iQ-F Series CPU module FX5U-32MR/DS: Versions 1.060 and later
    • MELSEC iQ-F Series CPU module FX5U-64MT/ES: Versions 1.060 and later
    • MELSEC iQ-F Series CPU module FX5U-64MT/DS: Versions 1.060 and later
    • MELSEC iQ-F Series CPU module FX5U-64MT/ESS: Versions 1.060 and later
    • MELSEC iQ-F Series CPU module FX5U-64MT/DSS: Versions 1.060 and later
    • MELSEC iQ-F Series CPU module FX5U-64MR/ES: Versions 1.060 and later
    • MELSEC iQ-F Series CPU module FX5U-64MR/DS: Versions 1.060 and later
    • MELSEC iQ-F Series CPU module FX5U-80MT/ES: Versions 1.060 and later
    • MELSEC iQ-F Series CPU module FX5U-80MT/DS: Versions 1.060 and later
    • MELSEC iQ-F Series CPU module FX5U-80MT/ESS: Versions 1.060 and later
    • MELSEC iQ-F Series CPU module FX5U-80MT/DSS: Versions 1.060 and later
    • MELSEC iQ-F Series CPU module FX5U-80MR/ES: Versions 1.060 and later
    • MELSEC iQ-F Series CPU module FX5U-80MR/DS: Versions 1.060 and later
    • MELSEC iQ-F Series CPU module FX5UC-32MT/D: Versions 1.060 and later
    • MELSEC iQ-F Series CPU module FX5UC-32MT/DSS: Versions 1.060 and later
    • MELSEC iQ-F Series CPU module FX5UC-64MT/D: Versions 1.060 and later
    • MELSEC iQ-F Series CPU module FX5UC-64MT/DSS: Versions 1.060 and later
    • MELSEC iQ-F Series CPU module FX5UC-96MT/D: Versions 1.060 and later
    • MELSEC iQ-F Series CPU module FX5UC-96MT/DSS: Versions 1.060 and later
    • MELSEC iQ-F Series CPU module FX5UC-32MT/DS-TS: Versions 1.060 and later
    • MELSEC iQ-F Series CPU module FX5UC-32MT/DSS-TS: Versions 1.060 and later
    • MELSEC iQ-F Series CPU module FX5UC-32MR/DS-TS: Versions 1.060 and later
    • MELSEC iQ-F Series CPU module FX5UJ-24MT/ES: All versions
    • MELSEC iQ-F Series CPU module FX5UJ-24MT/DS: All versions
    • MELSEC iQ-F Series CPU module FX5UJ-24MT/ESS: All versions
    • MELSEC iQ-F Series CPU module FX5UJ-24MT/DSS: All versions
    • MELSEC iQ-F Series CPU module FX5UJ-24MR/ES: All versions
    • MELSEC iQ-F Series CPU module FX5UJ-24MR/DS: All versions
    • MELSEC iQ-F Series CPU module FX5UJ-40MT/ES: All versions
    • MELSEC iQ-F Series CPU module FX5UJ-40MT/DS: All versions
    • MELSEC iQ-F Series CPU module FX5UJ-40MT/ESS: All versions
    • MELSEC iQ-F Series CPU module FX5UJ-40MT/DSS: All versions
    • MELSEC iQ-F Series CPU module FX5UJ-40MR/ES: All versions
    • MELSEC iQ-F Series CPU module FX5UJ-40MR/DS: All versions
    • MELSEC iQ-F Series CPU module FX5UJ-60MT/ES: All versions
    • MELSEC iQ-F Series CPU module FX5UJ-60MT/DS: All versions
    • MELSEC iQ-F Series CPU module FX5UJ-60MT/ESS: All versions
    • MELSEC iQ-F Series CPU module FX5UJ-60MT/DSS: All versions
    • MELSEC iQ-F Series CPU module FX5UJ-60MR/ES: All versions
    • MELSEC iQ-F Series CPU module FX5UJ-60MR/DS: All versions
    • MELSEC iQ-F Series CPU module FX5UJ-24MT/ES-A: All versions
    • MELSEC iQ-F Series CPU module FX5UJ-24MR/ES-A: All versions
    • MELSEC iQ-F Series CPU module FX5UJ-40MT/ES-A: All versions
    • MELSEC iQ-F Series CPU module FX5UJ-40MR/ES-A: All versions
    • MELSEC iQ-F Series CPU module FX5UJ-60MT/ES-A: All versions
    • MELSEC iQ-F Series CPU module FX5UJ-60MR/ES-A: All versions
    • MELSEC iQ-F Series CPU module FX5S-30MT/ES: All versions
    • MELSEC iQ-F Series CPU module FX5S-30MT/DS: All versions
    • MELSEC iQ-F Series CPU module FX5S-30MT/ESS: All versions
    • MELSEC iQ-F Series CPU module FX5S-30MT/DSS: All versions
    • MELSEC iQ-F Series CPU module FX5S-30MR/ES: All versions
    • MELSEC iQ-F Series CPU module FX5S-30MR/DS: All versions
    • MELSEC iQ-F Series CPU module FX5S-40MT/ES: All versions
    • MELSEC iQ-F Series CPU module FX5S-40MT/DS: All versions
    • MELSEC iQ-F Series CPU module FX5S-40MT/ESS: All versions
    • MELSEC iQ-F Series CPU module FX5S-40MT/DSS: All versions
    • MELSEC iQ-F Series CPU module FX5S-40MR/ES: All versions
    • MELSEC iQ-F Series CPU module FX5S-40MR/DS: All versions
    • MELSEC iQ-F Series CPU module FX5S-60MT/ES: All versions
    • MELSEC iQ-F Series CPU module FX5S-60MT/DS: All versions
    • MELSEC iQ-F Series CPU module FX5S-60MT/ESS: All versions
    • MELSEC iQ-F Series CPU module FX5S-60MT/DSS: All versions
    • MELSEC iQ-F Series CPU module FX5S-60MR/ES: All versions
    • MELSEC iQ-F Series CPU module FX5S-60MR/DS: All versions
    • MELSEC iQ-F Series CPU module FX5S-80MT/ES: All versions
    • MELSEC iQ-F Series CPU module FX5S-80MT/ESS: All versions
    • MELSEC iQ-F Series CPU module FX5S-80MR/ES: All versions

    3.2 VULNERABILITY OVERVIEW

    3.2.1 IMPROPER HANDLING OF LENGTH PARAMETER INCONSISTENCY CWE-130

    A Denial-of-Service (DoS) vulnerability due to Improper Handling of Length Parameter Inconsistency exists in the Web server function of the MELSEC iQ-F Series CPU module.

    CVE-2025-5514 has been assigned to this vulnerability. A CVSS v3 base score of 5.3 has been calculated; the CVSS vector string is (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L).

    3.3 BACKGROUND

    • CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE SECTORS: Critical Manufacturing
    • COUNTRIES/AREAS DEPLOYED: Worldwide
    • COMPANY HEADQUARTERS LOCATION: Japan

    3.4 RESEARCHER

    Thai Do, Minh Pham, Quan Le, and Loc Nguyen of OPSWAT Unit515 reported this vulnerability to Mitsubishi Electric Corporation. Mitsubishi Electric Corporation reported this vulnerability to CISA.

    4. MITIGATIONS

    Mitsubishi Electric Corporation advises that there are no plans to release a fixed version. Mitsubishi Electric recommends users take the following mitigation measures to minimize the risk of exploiting this vulnerability:

    • Use a firewall or virtual private network (VPN), etc. to prevent unauthorized access when Internet access is required.
    • Use within a LAN and block access from untrusted networks and hosts through firewalls.
    • Use IP filter function to block access from untrusted hosts. For details on the IP filter function, please refer to the manual for each product: “13.1 IP Filter Function” in the MELSEC iQ-F FX5 User’s Manual (Communication).
    • Restrict physical access to the affected products and the LAN connected by them.

    Mitsubishi Electric Corporation recommends users contact their local Mitsubishi Electric representative with questions.

    For more information, see Mitsubishi Electric’s security advisory.

    CISA recommends users take defensive measures to minimize the risk of exploitation of this vulnerability, such as:

    • Minimize network exposure for all control system devices and/or systems, ensuring they are not accessible from the internet.
    • Locate control system networks and remote devices behind firewalls and isolating them from business networks.
    • When remote access is required, use more secure methods, such as Virtual Private Networks (VPNs), recognizing VPNs may have vulnerabilities and should be updated to the most current version available. Also recognize VPN is only as secure as the connected devices.

    CISA reminds organizations to perform proper impact analysis and risk assessment prior to deploying defensive measures.

    CISA also provides a section for control systems security recommended practices on the ICS webpage on cisa.gov/ics. Several CISA products detailing cyber defense best practices are available for reading and download, including Improving Industrial Control Systems Cybersecurity with Defense-in-Depth Strategies.

    CISA encourages organizations to implement recommended cybersecurity strategies for proactive defense of ICS assets.

    Additional mitigation guidance and recommended practices are publicly available on the ICS webpage at cisa.gov/ics in the technical information paper, ICS-TIP-12-146-01B–Targeted Cyber Intrusion Detection and Mitigation Strategies.

    Organizations observing suspected malicious activity should follow established internal procedures and report findings to CISA for tracking and correlation against other incidents.

    No known public exploitation specifically targeting this vulnerability has been reported to CISA at this time.

    5. UPDATE HISTORY

    • August 21, 2025: Initial Publication
  • SIM-Swapper, Scattered Spider Hacker Gets 10 Years

    SIM-Swapper, Scattered Spider Hacker Gets 10 Years


    A 20-year-old Florida man at the center of a prolific cybercrime group known as “Scattered Spider” was sentenced to 10 years in federal prison today, and ordered to pay roughly $13 million in restitution to victims.

    Noah Michael Urban of Palm Coast, Fla. pleaded guilty in April 2025 to charges of wire fraud and conspiracy. Florida prosecutors alleged Urban conspired with others to steal at least $800,000 from five victims via SIM-swapping attacks that diverted their mobile phone calls and text messages to devices controlled by Urban and his co-conspirators.

    A booking photo of Noah Michael Urban released by the Volusia County Sheriff.

    Although prosecutors had asked for Urban to serve eight years, Jacksonville news outlet News4Jax.com reports the federal judge in the case today opted to sentence Urban to 120 months in federal prison, ordering him to pay $13 million in restitution and undergo three years of supervised release after his sentence is completed.

    In November 2024 Urban was charged by federal prosecutors in Los Angeles as one of five members of Scattered Spider (a.k.a. “Oktapus,” “Scatter Swine” and “UNC3944”), which specialized in SMS and voice phishing attacks that tricked employees at victim companies into entering their credentials and one-time passcodes at phishing websites. Urban pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to commit wire fraud in the California case, and the $13 million in restitution is intended to cover victims from both cases.

    The targeted SMS scams spanned several months during the summer of 2022, asking employees to click a link and log in at a website that mimicked their employer’s Okta authentication page. Some SMS phishing messages told employees their VPN credentials were expiring and needed to be changed; other missives advised employees about changes to their upcoming work schedule.

    That phishing spree netted Urban and others access to more than 130 companies, including Twilio, LastPass, DoorDash, MailChimp, and Plex. The government says the group used that access to steal proprietary company data and customer information, and that members also phished people to steal millions of dollars worth of cryptocurrency.

    For many years, Urban’s online hacker aliases “King Bob” and “Sosa” were fixtures of the Com, a mostly Telegram and Discord-based community of English-speaking cybercriminals wherein hackers boast loudly about high-profile exploits and hacks that almost invariably begin with social engineering. King Bob constantly bragged on the Com about stealing unreleased rap music recordings from popular artists, presumably through SIM-swapping attacks. Many of those purloined tracks or “grails” he later sold or gave away on forums.

    Noah “King Bob” Urban, posting to Twitter/X around the time of his sentencing today.

    Sosa also was active in a particularly destructive group of accomplished criminal SIM-swappers known as “Star Fraud.” Cyberscoop’s AJ Vicens reported in 2023 that individuals within Star Fraud were likely involved in the high-profile Caesars Entertainment and MGM Resorts extortion attacks that same year.

    The Star Fraud SIM-swapping group gained the ability to temporarily move targeted mobile numbers to devices they controlled by constantly phishing employees of the major mobile providers. In February 2023, KrebsOnSecurity published data taken from the Telegram channels for Star Fraud and two other SIM-swapping groups showing these crooks focused on SIM-swapping T-Mobile customers, and that they collectively claimed internal access to T-Mobile on 100 separate occasions over a 7-month period in 2022.

    Reached via one of his King Bob accounts on Twitter/X, Urban called the sentence unjust, and said the judge in his case discounted his age as a factor.

    “The judge purposefully ignored my age as a factor because of the fact another Scattered Spider member hacked him personally during the course of my case,” Urban said in reply to questions, noting that he was sending the messages from a Florida county jail. “He should have been removed as a judge much earlier on. But staying in county jail is torture.”

    A court transcript (PDF) from a status hearing in February 2025 shows Urban was telling the truth about the hacking incident that happened while he was in federal custody. It involved an intrusion into a magistrate judge’s email account, where a copy of Urban’s sealed indictment was stolen. The judge told attorneys for both sides that a co-defendant in the California case was trying to find out about Mr. Urban’s activity in the Florida case.

    “What it ultimately turned into a was a big faux pas,” Judge Harvey E. Schlesinger said. “The Court’s password…business is handled by an outside contractor. And somebody called the outside contractor representing Judge Toomey saying, ‘I need a password change.’ And they gave out the password change. That’s how whoever was making the phone call got into the court.”

  • Oregon Man Charged in ‘Rapper Bot’ DDoS Service

    Oregon Man Charged in ‘Rapper Bot’ DDoS Service


    A 22-year-old Oregon man has been arrested on suspicion of operating “Rapper Bot,” a massive botnet used to power a service for launching distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks against targets — including a March 2025 DDoS that knocked Twitter/X offline. The Justice Department asserts the suspect and an unidentified co-conspirator rented out the botnet to online extortionists, and tried to stay off the radar of law enforcement by ensuring that their botnet was never pointed at KrebsOnSecurity.

    The control panel for the Rapper Bot botnet greets users with the message “Welcome to the Ball Pit, Now with refrigerator support,” an apparent reference to a handful of IoT-enabled refrigerators that were enslaved in their DDoS botnet.

    On August 6, 2025, federal agents arrested Ethan J. Foltz of Springfield, Ore. on suspicion of operating Rapper Bot, a globally dispersed collection of tens of thousands of hacked Internet of Things (IoT) devices.

    The complaint against Foltz explains the attacks usually clocked in at more than two terabits of junk data per second (a terabit is one trillion bits of data), which is more than enough traffic to cause serious problems for all but the most well-defended targets. The government says Rapper Bot consistently launched attacks that were “hundreds of times larger than the expected capacity of a typical server located in a data center,” and that some of its biggest attacks exceeded six terabits per second.

    Indeed, Rapper Bot was reportedly responsible for the March 10, 2025 attack that caused intermittent outages on Twitter/X. The government says Rapper Bot’s most lucrative and frequent customers were involved in extorting online businesses — including numerous gambling operations based in China.

    The criminal complaint was written by Elliott Peterson, an investigator with the Defense Criminal Investigative Service (DCIS), the criminal investigative division of the Department of Defense (DoD) Office of Inspector General. The complaint notes the DCIS got involved because several Internet addresses maintained by the DoD were the target of Rapper Bot attacks.

    Peterson said he tracked Rapper Bot to Foltz after a subpoena to an ISP in Arizona that was hosting one of the botnet’s control servers showed the account was paid for via PayPal. More legal process to PayPal revealed Foltz’s Gmail account and previously used IP addresses. A subpoena to Google showed the defendant searched security blogs constantly for news about Rapper Bot, and for updates about competing DDoS-for-hire botnets.

    According to the complaint, after having a search warrant served on his residence the defendant admitted to building and operating Rapper Bot, sharing the profits 50/50 with a person he claimed to know only by the hacker handle “Slaykings.” Foltz also shared with investigators the logs from his Telegram chats, wherein Foltz and Slaykings discussed how best to stay off the radar of law enforcement investigators while their competitors were getting busted.

    Specifically, the two hackers chatted about a May 20 attack against KrebsOnSecurity.com that clocked in at more than 6.3 terabits of data per second. The brief attack was notable because at the time it was the largest DDoS that Google had ever mitigated (KrebsOnSecurity sits behind the protection of Project Shield, a free DDoS defense service that Google provides to websites offering news, human rights, and election-related content).

    The May 2025 DDoS was launched by an IoT botnet called Aisuru, which I discovered was operated by a 21-year-old man in Brazil named Kaike Southier Leite. This individual was more commonly known online as “Forky,” and Forky told me he wasn’t afraid of me or U.S. federal investigators. Nevertheless, the complaint against Foltz notes that Forky’s botnet seemed to diminish in size and firepower at the same time that Rapper Bot’s infection numbers were on the upswing.

    “Both FOLTZ and Slaykings were very dismissive of attention seeking activities, the most extreme of which, in their view, was to launch DDoS attacks against the website of the prominent cyber security journalist Brian Krebs,” Peterson wrote in the criminal complaint.

    “You see, they’ll get themselves [expletive],” Slaykings wrote in response to Foltz’s comments about Forky and Aisuru bringing too much heat on themselves.

    “Prob cuz [redacted] hit krebs,” Foltz wrote in reply.

    “Going against Krebs isn’t a good move,” Slaykings concurred. “It isn’t about being a [expletive] or afraid, you just get a lot of problems for zero money. Childish, but good. Let them die.”

    “Ye, it’s good tho, they will die,” Foltz replied.

    The government states that just prior to Foltz’s arrest, Rapper Bot had enslaved an estimated 65,000 devices globally. That may sound like a lot, but the complaint notes the defendants weren’t interested in making headlines for building the world’s largest or most powerful botnet.

    Quite the contrary: The complaint asserts that the accused took care to maintain their botnet in a “Goldilocks” size — ensuring that “the number of devices afforded powerful attacks while still being manageable to control and, in the hopes of Foltz and his partners, small enough to not be detected.”

    The complaint states that several days later, Foltz and Slaykings returned to discussing what that they expected to befall their rival group, with Slaykings stating, “Krebs is very revenge. He won’t stop until they are [expletive] to the bone.”

    “Surprised they have any bots left,” Foltz answered.

    “Krebs is not the one you want to have on your back. Not because he is scary or something, just because he will not give up UNTIL you are [expletive] [expletive]. Proved it with Mirai and many other cases.”

    [Unknown expletives aside, that may well be the highest compliment I’ve ever been paid by a cybercriminal. I might even have part of that quote made into a t-shirt or mug or something. It’s also nice that they didn’t let any of their customers attack my site — if even only out of a paranoid sense of self-preservation.]

    Foltz admitted to wiping the user and attack logs for the botnet approximately once a week, so investigators were unable to tally the total number of attacks, customers and targets of this vast crime machine. But the data that was still available showed that from April 2025 to early August, Rapper Bot conducted over 370,000 attacks, targeting 18,000 unique victims across 1,000 networks, with the bulk of victims residing in China, Japan, the United States, Ireland and Hong Kong (in that order).

    According to the government, Rapper Bot borrows much of its code from fBot, a DDoS malware strain also known as Satori. In 2020, authorities in Northern Ireland charged a then 20-year-old man named Aaron “Vamp” Sterritt with operating fBot with a co-conspirator. U.S. prosecutors are still seeking Sterritt’s extradition to the United States. fBot is itself a variation of the Mirai IoT botnet that has ravaged the Internet with DDoS attacks since its source code was leaked back in 2016.

    The complaint says Foltz and his partner did not allow most customers to launch attacks that were more than 60 seconds in duration — another way they tried to keep public attention to the botnet at a minimum. However, the government says the proprietors also had special arrangements with certain high-paying clients that allowed much larger and longer attacks.

    The accused and his alleged partner made light of this blog post about the fallout from one of their botnet attacks.

    Most people who have never been on the receiving end of a monster DDoS attack have no idea of the cost and disruption that such sieges can bring. The DCIS’s Peterson wrote that he was able to test the botnet’s capabilities while interviewing Foltz, and that found that “if this had been a server upon which I was running a website, using services such as load balancers, and paying for both outgoing and incoming data, at estimated industry average rates the attack (2+ Terabits per second times 30 seconds) might have cost the victim anywhere from $500 to $10,000.”

    “DDoS attacks at this scale often expose victims to devastating financial impact, and a potential alternative, network engineering solutions that mitigate the expected attacks such as overprovisioning, i.e. increasing potential Internet capacity, or DDoS defense technologies, can themselves be prohibitively expensive,” the complaint continues. “This ‘rock and a hard place’ reality for many victims can leave them acutely exposed to extortion demands – ‘pay X dollars and the DDoS attacks stop’.”

    The Telegram chat records show that the day before Peterson and other federal agents raided Foltz’s residence, Foltz allegedly told his partner he’d found 32,000 new devices that were vulnerable to a previously unknown exploit.

    Foltz and Slaykings discussing the discovery of an IoT vulnerability that will give them 32,000 new devices.

    Shortly before the search warrant was served on his residence, Foltz allegedly told his partner that “Once again we have the biggest botnet in the community.” The following day, Foltz told his partner that it was going to be a great day — the biggest so far in terms of income generated by Rapper Bot.

    “I sat next to Foltz while the messages poured in — promises of $800, then $1,000, the proceeds ticking up as the day went on,” Peterson wrote. “Noticing a change in Foltz’ behavior and concerned that Foltz was making changes to the botnet configuration in real time, Slaykings asked him ‘What’s up?’ Foltz deftly typed out some quick responses. Reassured by Foltz’ answer, Slaykings responded, ‘Ok, I’m the paranoid one.”

    The case is being prosecuted by Assistant U.S. Attorney Adam Alexander in the District of Alaska (at least some of the devices found to be infected with Rapper Bot were located there, and it is where Peterson is stationed). Foltz faces one count of aiding and abetting computer intrusions. If convicted, he faces a maximum penalty of 10 years in prison, although a federal judge is unlikely to award anywhere near that kind of sentence for a first-time conviction.

  • CISA Releases Four Industrial Control Systems Advisories

    CISA released four Industrial Control Systems (ICS) advisories on August 19, 2025. These advisories provide timely information about current security issues, vulnerabilities, and exploits surrounding ICS.

    CISA encourages users and administrators to review newly released ICS advisories for technical details and mitigations.

  • Siemens Mendix SAML Module

    As of January 10, 2023, CISA will no longer be updating ICS security advisories for Siemens product vulnerabilities beyond the initial advisory. For the most up-to-date information on vulnerabilities in this advisory, please see Siemens’ ProductCERT Security Advisories (CERT Services | Services | Siemens Global).

    View CSAF

    1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

    • CVSS v3 8.7
    • ATTENTION: Exploitable remotely
    • Vendor: Siemens
    • Equipment: Mendix SAML Module
    • Vulnerability: Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature

    2. RISK EVALUATION

    Successful exploitation of this vulnerability could allow unauthenticated remote attackers to hijack an account in specific SSO configurations.

    3. TECHNICAL DETAILS

    3.1 AFFECTED PRODUCTS

    Siemens reports that the following products are affected:

    • Siemens Mendix SAML (Mendix 9.24 compatible): Versions prior to V3.6.21
    • Siemens Mendix SAML (Mendix 10.12 compatible): Versions prior to V4.0.3
    • Siemens Mendix SAML (Mendix 10.21 compatible): Versions prior to V4.1.2

    3.2 VULNERABILITY OVERVIEW

    3.2.1 IMPROPER VERIFICATION OF CRYPTOGRAPHIC SIGNATURE CWE-347

    Affected versions of the module insufficiently enforce signature validation and binding checks. This could allow unauthenticated remote attackers to hijack an account in specific SSO configurations.

    CVE-2025-40758 has been assigned to this vulnerability. A CVSS v3.1 base score of 8.7 has been calculated; the CVSS vector string is (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N).

    3.3 BACKGROUND

    • CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE SECTORS: Critical Manufacturing
    • COUNTRIES/AREAS DEPLOYED: Worldwide
    • COMPANY HEADQUARTERS LOCATION: Germany

    3.4 RESEARCHER

    Siemens reported this vulnerability to CISA.

    4. MITIGATIONS

    Siemens has identified the following specific workarounds and mitigations users can apply to reduce risk:

    • All affected products: Make sure to use configurations where UseEncryption is enabled
    • Mendix SAML (Mendix 9.24 compatible): Update to V3.6.21 or later version
    • Mendix SAML (Mendix 10.12 compatible): Update to V4.0.3 or later version
    • Mendix SAML (Mendix 10.21 compatible): Update to V4.1.2 or later version

    As a general security measure, Siemens recommends protecting network access to devices with appropriate mechanisms. To operate the devices in a protected IT environment, Siemens recommends configuring the environment according to Siemens’ operational guidelines for industrial security and following recommendations in the product manuals.

    Additional information on industrial security by Siemens can be found on the Siemens industrial security webpage

    For more information see the associated Siemens security advisory SSA-395458 in HTML and CSAF.

    CISA recommends users take defensive measures to minimize the risk of exploitation of this vulnerability, such as:

    • Minimize network exposure for all control system devices and/or systems, ensuring they are not accessible from the internet.
    • Locate control system networks and remote devices behind firewalls and isolating them from business networks.
    • When remote access is required, use more secure methods, such as Virtual Private Networks (VPNs). Recognize VPNs may have vulnerabilities, should be updated to the most recent version available, and are only as secure as the connected devices.

    CISA reminds organizations to perform proper impact analysis and risk assessment prior to deploying defensive measures.

    CISA also provides a section for control systems security recommended practices on the ICS webpage on cisa.gov. Several CISA products detailing cyber defense best practices are available for reading and download, including Improving Industrial Control Systems Cybersecurity with Defense-in-Depth Strategies.

    CISA encourages organizations to implement recommended cybersecurity strategies for proactive defense of ICS assets.

    Additional mitigation guidance and recommended practices are publicly available on the ICS webpage at cisa.gov in the technical information paper, ICS-TIP-12-146-01B–Targeted Cyber Intrusion Detection and Mitigation Strategies.

    Organizations observing suspected malicious activity should follow established internal procedures and report findings to CISA for tracking and correlation against other incidents.

    CISA also recommends users take the following measures to protect themselves from social engineering attacks:

    No known public exploitation specifically targeting this vulnerability has been reported to CISA at this time. This vulnerability has a high attack complexity.

    5. UPDATE HISTORY

    • August 19, 2025: Initial Republication of Siemens ProductCERT SSA-395458
  • Siemens Desigo CC Product Family and SENTRON Powermanager

    As of January 10, 2023, CISA will no longer be updating ICS security advisories for Siemens product vulnerabilities beyond the initial advisory. For the most up-to-date information on vulnerabilities in this advisory, please see Siemens’ ProductCERT Security Advisories (CERT Services | Services | Siemens Global).

    View CSAF

    1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

    • CVSS v3 8.2
    • ATTENTION: Low attack complexity
    • Vendor: Siemens
    • Equipment: Desigo CC Product Family and SENTRON Powermanager
    • Vulnerability: Least Privilege Violation

    2. RISK EVALUATION

    Successful exploitation of this vulnerability could allow privilege escalation.

    3. TECHNICAL DETAILS

    3.1 AFFECTED PRODUCTS

    Siemens reports that the following products are affected:

    • Desigo CC family V5.0: All versions
    • Desigo CC family V5.1: All versions
    • Desigo CC family V6: All versions
    • Desigo CC family V7: All versions
    • Desigo CC family V8: All versions
    • SENTRON Powermanager V5: All versions
    • SENTRON Powermanager V6: All versions
    • SENTRON Powermanager V7: All versions
    • SENTRON Powermanager V8: All versions

    3.2 VULNERABILITY OVERVIEW

    3.2.1 LEAST PRIVILEGE VIOLATION CWE-272

    Wibu CodeMeter before 8.30a sometimes allows privilege escalation immediately after installation (before a logoff or reboot). For exploitation, there must have been an unprivileged installation with UAC, and the CodeMeter Control Center component must be installed, and the CodeMeter Control Center component must not have been restarted. In this scenario, the local user can navigate from Import License to a privileged instance of Windows Explorer.

    CVE-2025-47809 has been assigned to this vulnerability. A CVSS v3.1 base score of 8.2 has been calculated; the CVSS vector string is (CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H).

    3.3 BACKGROUND

    • CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE SECTORS: Critical Manufacturing
    • COUNTRIES/AREAS DEPLOYED: Worldwide
    • COMPANY HEADQUARTERS LOCATION: Germany

    3.4 RESEARCHER

    Siemens reported this vulnerability to CISA.

    4. MITIGATIONS

    Siemens has identified the following specific workarounds and mitigations users can apply to reduce risk:

    Please follow below steps to update the WIBU CodeMeter :

    • Uninstall the previous installed version of CodeMeter via Control Panel
    • Install the CodeMeter V8.30a (Refer: https://www.wibu.com/us/support.html)
    • Restart client/server after installation of CodeMeter

    For more details regarding the vulnerability in CodeMeter Runtime refer to:

    As a general security measure, Siemens recommends protecting network access to devices with appropriate mechanisms. To operate the devices in a protected IT environment, Siemens recommends configuring the environment according to Siemens’ operational guidelines for industrial security and following recommendations in the product manuals.

    Additional information on industrial security by Siemens can be found on the Siemens industrial security webpage

    For more information see the associated Siemens security advisory SSA-201595 in HTML and CSAF.

    CISA recommends users take defensive measures to minimize the risk of exploitation of this vulnerability, such as:

    • Minimize network exposure for all control system devices and/or systems, ensuring they are not accessible from the internet.
    • Locate control system networks and remote devices behind firewalls and isolating them from business networks.
    • When remote access is required, use more secure methods, such as Virtual Private Networks (VPNs). Recognize VPNs may have vulnerabilities, should be updated to the most recent version available, and are only as secure as the connected devices.

    CISA reminds organizations to perform proper impact analysis and risk assessment prior to deploying defensive measures.

    CISA also provides a section for control systems security recommended practices on the ICS webpage on cisa.gov. Several CISA products detailing cyber defense best practices are available for reading and download, including Improving Industrial Control Systems Cybersecurity with Defense-in-Depth Strategies.

    CISA encourages organizations to implement recommended cybersecurity strategies for proactive defense of ICS assets.

    Additional mitigation guidance and recommended practices are publicly available on the ICS webpage at cisa.gov in the technical information paper, ICS-TIP-12-146-01B–Targeted Cyber Intrusion Detection and Mitigation Strategies.

    Organizations observing suspected malicious activity should follow established internal procedures and report findings to CISA for tracking and correlation against other incidents.

    CISA also recommends users take the following measures to protect themselves from social engineering attacks:

    No known public exploitation specifically targeting this vulnerability has been reported to CISA at this time. This vulnerability is not exploitable remotely.

    5. UPDATE HISTORY

    • August 19, 2025: Initial Republication of Siemens ProductCERT SSA-201595
  • CISA Adds One Known Exploited Vulnerability to Catalog

    CISA has added one new vulnerability to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) Catalog, based on evidence of active exploitation. 

    • CVE-2025-54948 Trend Micro Apex One OS Command Injection Vulnerability

    These types of vulnerabilities are frequent attack vectors for malicious cyber actors and pose significant risks to the federal enterprise. 

    Binding Operational Directive (BOD) 22-01: Reducing the Significant Risk of Known Exploited Vulnerabilities established the KEV Catalog as a living list of known Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVEs) that carry significant risk to the federal enterprise. BOD 22-01 requires Federal Civilian Executive Branch (FCEB) agencies to remediate identified vulnerabilities by the due date to protect FCEB networks against active threats. See the BOD 22-01 Fact Sheet for more information. 

    Although BOD 22-01 only applies to FCEB agencies, CISA strongly urges all organizations to reduce their exposure to cyberattacks by prioritizing timely remediation of KEV Catalog vulnerabilities as part of their vulnerability management practice. CISA will continue to add vulnerabilities to the catalog that meet the specified criteria

  • Mobile Phishers Target Brokerage Accounts in ‘Ramp and Dump’ Cashout Scheme

    Mobile Phishers Target Brokerage Accounts in ‘Ramp and Dump’ Cashout Scheme


    Cybercriminal groups peddling sophisticated phishing kits that convert stolen card data into mobile wallets have recently shifted their focus to targeting customers of brokerage services, new research shows. Undeterred by security controls at these trading platforms that block users from wiring funds directly out of accounts, the phishers have pivoted to using multiple compromised brokerage accounts in unison to manipulate the prices of foreign stocks.

    Image: Shutterstock, WhataWin.

    This so-called ‘ramp and dump‘ scheme borrows its name from age-old “pump and dump” scams, wherein fraudsters purchase a large number of shares in some penny stock, and then promote the company in a frenzied social media blitz to build up interest from other investors. The fraudsters dump their shares after the price of the penny stock increases to some degree, which usually then causes a sharp drop in the value of the shares for legitimate investors.

    With ramp and dump, the scammers do not need to rely on ginning up interest in the targeted stock on social media. Rather, they will preposition themselves in the stock that they wish to inflate, using compromised accounts to purchase large volumes of it and then dumping the shares after the stock price reaches a certain value. In February 2025, the FBI said it was seeking information from victims of this scheme.

    “In this variation, the price manipulation is primarily the result of controlled trading activity conducted by the bad actors behind the scam,” reads an advisory from the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA), a private, non-profit organization that regulates member brokerage firms. “Ultimately, the outcome for unsuspecting investors is the same—a catastrophic collapse in share price that leaves investors with unrecoverable losses.”

    Ford Merrill is a security researcher at SecAlliance, a CSIS Security Group company. Merrill said he has tracked recent ramp-and-dump activity to a bustling Chinese-language community that is quite openly selling advanced mobile phishing kits on Telegram.

    “They will often coordinate with other actors and will wait until a certain time to buy a particular Chinese IPO [initial public offering] stock or penny stock,” said Merrill, who has been chronicling the rapid maturation and growth of the China-based phishing community over the past three years.

    “They’ll use all these victim brokerage accounts, and if needed they’ll liquidate the account’s current positions, and will preposition themselves in that instrument in some account they control, and then sell everything when the price goes up,” he said. “The victim will be left with worthless shares of that equity in their account, and the brokerage may not be happy either.”

    Merrill said the early days of these phishing groups — between 2022 and 2024 — were typified by phishing kits that used text messages to spoof the U.S. Postal Service or some local toll road operator, warning about a delinquent shipping or toll fee that needed paying. Recipients who clicked the link and provided their payment information at a fake USPS or toll operator site were then asked to verify the transaction by sharing a one-time code sent via text message.

    In reality, the victim’s bank is sending that code to the mobile number on file for their customer because the fraudsters have just attempted to enroll that victim’s card details into a mobile wallet. If the visitor supplies that one-time code, their payment card is then added to a new mobile wallet on an Apple or Google device that is physically controlled by the phishers.

    The phishing gangs typically load multiple stolen cards to digital wallets on a single Apple or Android device, and then sell those phones in bulk to scammers who use them for fraudulent e-commerce and tap-to-pay transactions.

    An image from the Telegram channel for a popular Chinese mobile phishing kit vendor shows 10 mobile phones for sale, each loaded with 4-6 digital wallets from different financial institutions.

    This China-based phishing collective exposed a major weakness common to many U.S.-based financial institutions that already require multi-factor authentication: The reliance on a single, phishable one-time token for provisioning mobile wallets. Happily, Merrill said many financial institutions that were caught flat-footed on this scam two years ago have since strengthened authentication requirements for onboarding new mobile wallets (such as requiring the card to be enrolled via the bank’s mobile app).

    But just as squeezing one part of a balloon merely forces the air trapped inside to bulge into another area, fraudsters don’t go away when you make their current enterprise less profitable: They just shift their focus to a less-guarded area. And lately, that gaze has settled squarely on customers of the major brokerage platforms, Merrill said.

    THE OUTSIDER

    Merrill pointed to several Telegram channels operated by some of the more accomplished phishing kit sellers, which are full of videos demonstrating how every feature in their kits can be tailored to the attacker’s target. The video snippet below comes from the Telegram channel of “Outsider,” a popular Mandarin-speaking phishing kit vendor whose latest offering includes a number of ready-made templates for using text messages to phish brokerage account credentials and one-time codes.

    

    According to Merrill, Outsider is a woman who previously went by the handle “Chenlun.” KrebsOnSecurity profiled Chenlun’s phishing empire in an October 2023 story about a China-based group that was phishing mobile customers of more than a dozen postal services around the globe. In that case, the phishing sites were using a Telegram bot that sent stolen credentials to the “@chenlun” Telegram account.

    Chenlun’s phishing lures are sent via Apple’s iMessage and Google’s RCS service and spoof one of the major brokerage platforms, warning that the account has been suspended for suspicious activity and that recipients should log in and verify some information. The missives include a link to a phishing page that collects the customer’s username and password, and then asks the user to enter a one-time code that will arrive via SMS.

    The new phish kit videos on Outsider’s Telegram channel only feature templates for Schwab customers, but Merrill said the kit can easily be adapted to target other brokerage platforms. One reason the fraudsters are picking on brokerage firms, he said, has to do with the way they handle multi-factor authentication.

    Schwab clients are presented with two options for second factor authentication when they open an account. Users who select the option to only prompt for a code on untrusted devices can choose to receive it via text message, an automated inbound phone call, or an outbound call to Schwab. With the “always at login” option selected, users can choose to receive the code through the Schwab app, a text message, or a Symantec VIP mobile app.

    In response to questions, Schwab said it regularly updates clients on emerging fraud trends, including this specific type, which the company addressed in communications sent to clients earlier this year.

    The 2FA text message from Schwab warns recipients against giving away their one-time code.

    “That message focused on trading-related fraud, highlighting both account intrusions and scams conducted through social media or messaging apps that deceive individuals into executing trades themselves,” Schwab said in a written statement. “We are aware and tracking this trend across several channels, as well as others like it, which attempt to exploit SMS-based verification with stolen credentials. We actively monitor for suspicious patterns and take steps to disrupt them. This activity is part of a broader, industry-wide threat, and we take a multi-layered approach to address and mitigate it.”

    Other popular brokerage platforms allow similar methods for multi-factor authentication. Fidelity requires a username and password on initial login, and offers the ability to receive a one-time token via SMS, an automated phone call, or by approving a push notification sent through the Fidelity mobile app. However, all three of these methods for sending one-time tokens are phishable; even with the brokerage firm’s app, the phishers could prompt the user to approve a login request that they initiated in the app with the phished credentials.

    Vanguard offers customers a range of multi-factor authentication choices, including the option to require a physical security key in addition to one’s credentials on each login. A security key implements a robust form of multi-factor authentication known as Universal 2nd Factor (U2F), which allows the user to complete the login process simply by connecting an enrolled USB or Bluetooth device and pressing a button. The key works without the need for any special software drivers, and the nice thing about it is your second factor cannot be phished.

    THE PERFECT CRIME?

    Merrill said that in many ways the ramp-and-dump scheme is the perfect crime because it leaves precious few connections between the victim brokerage accounts and the fraudsters.

    “It’s really genius because it decouples so many things,” he said. “They can buy shares [in the stock to be pumped] in their personal account on the Chinese exchanges, and the price happens to go up. The Chinese or Hong Kong brokerages aren’t going to see anything funky.”

    Merrill said it’s unclear exactly how those perpetrating these ramp-and-dump schemes coordinate their activities, such as whether the accounts are phished well in advance or shortly before being used to inflate the stock price of Chinese companies. The latter possibility would fit nicely with the existing human infrastructure these criminal groups already have in place.

    For example, KrebsOnSecurity recently wrote about research from Merrill and other researchers showing the phishers behind these slick mobile phishing kits employed people to sit for hours at a time in front of large banks of mobile phones being used to send the text message lures. These technicians were needed to respond in real time to victims who were supplying the one-time code sent from their financial institution.

    The ashtray says: You’ve been phishing all night.

    “You can get access to a victim’s brokerage with a one-time passcode, but then you sort of have to use it right away if you can’t set new security settings so you can come back to that account later,” Merrill said.

    The rapid pace of innovations produced by these China-based phishing vendors is due in part to their use of artificial intelligence and large language models to help develop the mobile phishing kits, he added.

    “These guys are vibe coding stuff together and using LLMs to translate things or help put the user interface together,” Merrill said. “It’s only a matter of time before they start to integrate the LLMs into their development cycle to make it more rapid. The technologies they are building definitely have helped lower the barrier of entry for everyone.”

  • Siemens Opcenter Quality

    As of January 10, 2023, CISA will no longer be updating ICS security advisories for Siemens product vulnerabilities beyond the initial advisory. For the most up-to-date information on vulnerabilities in this advisory, please see Siemens’ ProductCERT Security Advisories (CERT Services | Services | Siemens Global).
     

    View CSAF

    1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

    • CVSS v3 7.1
    • ATTENTION: Exploitable from adjacent network/low attack complexity
    • Vendor: Siemens
    • Equipment: Opcenter Quality
    • Vulnerabilities: Incorrect Authorization, Missing Encryption of Sensitive Data, Generation of Error Message Containing Sensitive Information, Insufficient Session Expiration, Use of a Broken or Risky Cryptographic Algorithm

    2. RISK EVALUATION

    Successful exploitation of these vulnerabilities could allow an attacker to gain complete access of the application, access to sensitive information, access to session information, or execute a Machine-In-The-Middle attack and compromise confidentiality and integrity of data.

    3. TECHNICAL DETAILS

    3.1 AFFECTED PRODUCTS

    Siemens reports that the following products are affected:

    • Siemens SmartClient modules Opcenter QL Home (SC): Versions between 13.2 and 2506
    • Siemens SOA Audit: Versions between 13.2 and 2506
    • Siemens SOA Cockpit: Versions between 13.2 and 2506

    3.2 VULNERABILITY OVERVIEW

    3.2.1 INCORRECT AUTHORIZATION CWE-863

    The affected application does not enforce mandatory authorization on some functionality level at server side. This could allow an authenticated attacker to gain complete access of the application.

    CVE-2024-41979 has been assigned to this vulnerability. A CVSS v3.1 base score of 7.1 has been calculated; the CVSS vector string is (CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H).

    3.2.2 MISSING ENCRYPTION OF SENSITIVE DATA CWE-311

    The affected application do not encrypt the communication in LDAP interface by default. This could allow an authenticated attacker to gain unauthorized access to sensitive information.

    CVE-2024-41980 has been assigned to this vulnerability. A CVSS v3.1 base score of 3.1 has been calculated; the CVSS vector string is (CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N).

    3.2.3 MISSING ENCRYPTION OF SENSITIVE DATA CWE-311

    The affected application does not have adequate encryption of sensitive information. This could allow an authenticated attacker to gain access of sensitive information.

    CVE-2024-41982 has been assigned to this vulnerability. A CVSS v3.1 base score of 4.8 has been calculated; the CVSS vector string is (CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N).

    3.2.4 GENERATION OF ERROR MESSAGE CONTAINING SENSITIVE INFORMATION CWE-209

    The affected application displays SQL statement in the error messages encountered during the generation of reports using Cockpit tool.

    CVE-2024-41983 has been assigned to this vulnerability. A CVSS v3.1 base score of 3.5 has been calculated; the CVSS vector string is (CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N).

    3.2.5 GENERATION OF ERROR MESSAGE CONTAINING SENSITIVE INFORMATION CWE-209

    The affected application improperly handles error while accessing an inaccessible resource leading to exposing the system applications.

    CVE-2024-41984 has been assigned to this vulnerability. A CVSS v3.1 base score of 2.6 has been calculated; the CVSS vector string is (CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N).

    3.2.6 INSUFFICIENT SESSION EXPIRATION CWE-613

    The affected application does not expire the session without logout. This could allow an attacker to get unauthorized access if the session is left idle.

    CVE-2024-41985 has been assigned to this vulnerability. A CVSS v3.1 base score of 2.6 has been calculated; the CVSS vector string is (CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N).

    3.2.7 USE OF A BROKEN OR RISKY CRYPTOGRAPHIC ALGORITHM CWE-327

    The affected application support insecure TLS 1.0 and 1.1 protocol. An attacker could achieve a man-in-the-middle attack and compromise confidentiality and integrity of data.

    CVE-2024-41986 has been assigned to this vulnerability. A CVSS v3.1 base score of 6.4 has been calculated; the CVSS vector string is (CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:L).

    3.3 BACKGROUND

    • CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE SECTORS: Critical Manufacturing
    • COUNTRIES/AREAS DEPLOYED: Worldwide
    • COMPANY HEADQUARTERS LOCATION: Germany

    3.4 RESEARCHER

    Siemens reported these vulnerabilities to CISA.

    4. MITIGATIONS

    Siemens has identified the following specific workarounds and mitigations users can apply to reduce risk:

    • All affected products: Update to V2506 or later version
    • (CVE-2024-41979) All affected products: The SmartClient should be operated in a secured network and context only
    • (CVE-2024-41979) All affected products: Remove all tools giving possibility to call SOAP-services outside from the SmartClient
    • (CVE-2024-41979) All affected products: The hardening instructions mentioned in the products security concept should be followed
    • (CVE-2024-41980) All affected products: Harden LDAP-interface secure protocols by enabling the SSL-flag on configuration and a proper setup of your TLS-configuration
    • (CVE-2024-41980) All affected products: All the users (including in LDAP) should be given the least privileges required
    • (CVE-2024-41982) All affected products: Limit the permission to access those fields using the least privilege strategy
    • (CVE-2024-41983) All affected products: Do not use original table structures and accounts for reporting. Create your own reporting accounts which have access via synonyms forwarding on views representing access to result-sets the user may use for evaluation
    • (CVE-2024-41983) All affected products: Use DB-tools to limit load on productive systems for reporting accounts or use offline systems for reporting
    • (CVE-2024-41983) All affected products: Harden your IIS
    • (CVE-2024-41983) All affected products: Prevent any scanning of structures and configurations
    • (CVE-2024-41983) All affected products: Limit the information to prevent to the end-user based on the need-to-know-principle to the minimum possible information
    • (CVE-2024-41984) All affected products: Hardening of the solution, including the OS and IIS, is required, with specific measures such as hiding the IIS version to enhance security
    • (CVE-2024-41984) All affected products: Users should not have the possibility to scan folders and extensions of files allowed to open should be limited to the required one
    • (CVE-2024-41986) All affected products: Disable all protocols (SSL v2/v3, TLS 1.0, TLS 1.1) the solution should not use.
    • (CVE-2024-41986) All affected products: Ensure, TLS 1.2 is enabled if you plan to use TLS 1.2.
    • (CVE-2024-41986) All affected products: Follow the instructions of the security concept of Opcenter Quality and vendors.

    As a general security measure, Siemens recommends protecting network access to devices with appropriate mechanisms. To operate the devices in a protected IT environment, Siemens recommends configuring the environment according to Siemens’ operational guidelines for industrial security and following recommendations in the product manuals.

    Additional information on industrial security by Siemens can be found on the Siemens industrial security webpage

    For more information see the associated Siemens security advisory SSA-382999 in HTML and CSAF.

    CISA recommends users take defensive measures to minimize the risk of exploitation of these vulnerabilities, such as:

    • Minimize network exposure for all control system devices and/or systems, ensuring they are not accessible from the internet.
    • Locate control system networks and remote devices behind firewalls and isolating them from business networks.
    • When remote access is required, use more secure methods, such as Virtual Private Networks (VPNs). Recognize VPNs may have vulnerabilities, should be updated to the most recent version available, and are only as secure as the connected devices.

    CISA reminds organizations to perform proper impact analysis and risk assessment prior to deploying defensive measures.

    CISA also provides a section for control systems security recommended practices on the ICS webpage on cisa.gov. Several CISA products detailing cyber defense best practices are available for reading and download, including Improving Industrial Control Systems Cybersecurity with Defense-in-Depth Strategies.

    CISA encourages organizations to implement recommended cybersecurity strategies for proactive defense of ICS assets.

    Additional mitigation guidance and recommended practices are publicly available on the ICS webpage at cisa.gov in the technical information paper, ICS-TIP-12-146-01B–Targeted Cyber Intrusion Detection and Mitigation Strategies.

    Organizations observing suspected malicious activity should follow established internal procedures and report findings to CISA for tracking and correlation against other incidents.

    CISA also recommends users take the following measures to protect themselves from social engineering attacks:

    No known public exploitation specifically targeting these vulnerabilities has been reported to CISA at this time. These vulnerabilities are not exploitable remotely.

    5. UPDATE HISTORY

    • August 14, 2025: Initial Republication of Siemens ProductCERT SSA-382999